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Abstract
We present a number of enhancements to the voter verifiable elec-
tion scheme Preˆt a` Voter scheme [1]. Firstly, we propose a mechanism
for the distributed construction by a set of independent clerks of the
ballot forms. This construction leads to proto-ballot forms with the
candidate list encrypted and ensures that only a collusion of all the
clerks could determine the cryptographic seeds or the onion/candidate
list association. This eliminates the need to trust a single authority
to keep this information secret. Furthermore, it allows the on-demand
decryption and printing of the ballot forms, so eliminating chain of
custody issues and the chain voting style attacks against encrypted
receipt schemes identified in [8].
The ballot forms proposed here use ElGamal randomised encryp-
tion so enabling the use of re-encryption mixes for the anonymising
tabulation phase in place of the decryption mixes. This has a number
of advantages over the RSA, decryption mixes used previously: toler-
ance against failure of any of the mix tellers, full mixing of terms over
the Z∗
p
space and enabling the mixes and audits to be fully indepen-
dently rerun if necessary.
1 Introduction
The Preˆt a` Voter scheme, presented in [1], is a cryptographic voting scheme
that enables voter-verifiability: at the time of casting their vote, voters are
provided with an encrypted receipt. They can then check, via a secure Web
∗University of Newcastle
†University of Surrey
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Bulletin Board (WBB), that their receipt is accurately included in a robust
anonymising mix process. Various checking mechanisms serve to detect any
corruption in any phase of this process: encryption of the vote, recording
and transmission of the encrypted ballot receipt and the decryptions of the
votes. Full details can be found in [1]. Henceforth we will refer to this
version of the scheme as Preˆt a` Voter’05.
Preˆt a` Voter seeks to achieve the goals of accuracy and ballot secrecy
with minimal trust in the system: software, hardware, officials. Assurance
is achieved through a high degree of transparency and we thus verify the
correctness of the election rather that attempting to verify the system.
This scheme has the benefit of providing a very simple and familiar
voter experience, but certain vulnerabilities and trust assumptions have been
identified, see [8]. In this paper we present a number of enhancements
designed to counter these threats and eliminate the need for these trust
assumptions.
The construction of the ballot forms presented here also enables the
use of re-encryption mixes in the anonymising/tabulation phase. This also
provides a number of advantages over the RSA/decryption mixes of Preˆt a`
Voter’05.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section we give the
key elements of Preˆt a` Voter’05. Section 3 summarises some of the threats
to and trust assumptions needed in Preˆt a` Voter’05. Section 4 presents the
distributed construction of encrypted ballot forms. Sections 5 and 6 describe
how these forms can be used in the vote casting process.Section 7 describes
the use of this construction for re-encryption mixes during the anonymising
and tabulation phase. Sections 8 and 9 describe the new auditing proce-
dures required for the new ElGamal style ballot forms. Sections 10 and 11
discuss some further extensions to deal with more general voting methods
and remote voting.
2 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter 2005
We now present an overview of the Preˆt a` Voter voter-verifiable scheme.
Voters select at random a ballot form, and example of which is shown in
Figure 1.
In the booth, the voter makes her selection in the usual way by placing
a cross in the right hand column against the candidate of choice, or, in
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Figure 1: Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
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Figure 2: Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt
the case of an STV system for example, they mark their ranking against
the candidates. Once the selection has been marked, the left hand strip is
detached and discarded. The remaining right hand strip now constitutes
the receipt, as shown in Figure 2.
The voter now exits the booth and casts their vote in the presence of an
official. The ballot receipt is placed under an optical reader or similar device
that records the random value at the bottom of the strip and an index value
indicating the cell into which the X was marked. The receipt is digitally
signed and franked and the voter now retains this as their receipt.
Possession of a receipt might appear to open up the possibility of coer-
cion or vote-buying. However, the candidate lists on the ballot forms are
independently randomised for each ballot form. Thus, with the left hand
strip removed, the right hand strip alone does not indicate which way the
vote was cast.
The random value printed on the bottom of the receipt, the ‘onion’, is
the key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this value
is the information needed to reconstruct the candidate list shown on the
left hand strip. This information is encrypted under the secret keys shared
by a number of tellers. Thus, only the tellers acting in concert are able to
reconstruct the candidate order and so interpret the vote value encoded on
the receipt.
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Once the election has closed, all the receipts are transmitted to a central
tabulation server which posts them to a secure WBB. This is an append-only,
publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation server, and later the tellers, can
write to this and, once written, anything posted to it will remain unchanged.
Voters can visit this WBB and confirm that their receipt appears correctly.
After a suitable period, the tellers take over and perform a robust,
anonymising, decryption mix on the batch of posted receipts. Various ap-
proaches can be used to ensure that the tellers perform the decryptions
correctly. Details of this can be found in [1].
Preˆt a` Voter 2005 proposes an Authority responsible for the generation
of the entropy for the crypto seeds and prior printing of the ballot forms.
Random auditing, by independent organisations, of the forms before, during
and after the election serve to detect any attempt by the the Authority to
pass off incorrectly formed ballot forms. Later in this paper we propose an
alternative approach using on-demand creation and printing of forms and
post-auditing.
This approach has the advantage of simplicity and results in a very simple
and familiar experience for the voters: they simply register, collect a form,
mark their selection in the booth and them cast the form.
For full details of the mechanisms used in the 2005 version of the scheme
to detect any malfunction or misbehaviour by the devices or processes that
comprise the scheme, see [1]. The construction of the ballot forms used here
calls for rather different monitoring and auditing mechanisms that we detail
later.
3 Threats and trust models
The simplicity of the original scheme, in particular the use of a single au-
thority and the pre-printing and pre-auditing of the ballot forms, comes at
a certain cost: various trust assumptions need to be made. In this section
we briefly recall the threats and assumptions of Preˆt a` Voter 2005 identified
in [8].
3.1 The need to trust the Authority for confidentiality
In Preˆt a` Voter 2005, a single entity creates the ballot forms. Whilst it
is not necessary to trust this entity from the point of view of accuracy, it
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is necessary to trust it not to leak the ballot form information. Clearly,
if the Authority were to leak this information, the scheme would become
susceptible to coercion or vote buying.
3.2 Chain of custody
Just as we need to trust the Authority not to leak ballot form information,
we also need to assume that mechanisms are in place to ensure that none of
this information is leaked during storage and distribution. Various counter-
measures are possible: for example, ballot forms could be kept in sealed
envelopes to be revealed only by the voters in the booth. Alternatively,
a scratch card style mechanism along the lines suggested in [8] could be
used to conceal the onion value until the voter reveals it at the time of vote
casting. The ballot forms would also need to be stored and distributed in
locked, sealed boxes. All of these counter-measures are rather procedural in
nature and so require various trust assumptions.
3.3 Chain voting
Conventional, pen and paper elections may be vulnerable to a style form
of vote buying known as chain voting. The UK system in particular is
vulnerable. Here, the ballot forms are a controlled resource: on entering
the polling station, the voter is registered and marked off on the electoral
roll. They are given a ballot form which they take to the booth, mark and
then cast in the ballot box. In principle, officials should observe the voters
casting their form.
The attack works as follows: the coercer smuggles a blank ballot form
out of the polling station. The controls on the distribution of the forms
should make this a little tricky, but in practise there are many ways it could
be achieved. Having marked the form for the candidate of their choice, the
coercer intercepts a voter as they enter the polling station. The voter is told
that if, when they exit the polling station, they hand a fresh, blank form
back to the coercer they will receive an reward. The attack can now proceed
inductively until a voter decides to cry foul. Note that, once initialised,
the controls on the ballot forms works in the coercer’s favour: if the voter
emerges from the polling station with a blank form, it is a strong indication
that they did indeed cast the marked form they were given by the coercer.
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3.4 Kleptographic channels
A further, rather subtle vulnerability can occur where a single entity is
responsible for creating cryptographic variables: kleptographic attacks as
described in [9]. The possible relevance of such attacks to cryptographic
voting schemes is described in [6]. The idea is that the entity may carefully
choose the values of the crypto variables in order to leak information to a
colluding party. In the case of Preˆt a` Voter, the Authority might choose
the seed values in such a way that an agreed, keyed cryptographic hash
of the onion value indicates the candidate order. Clearly this may require
quite a bit of searching a computation to find suitable values. Note however
that such an attack could pass unnoticed: the distribution of seed values
would look perfectly random to anyone ignorant of the cryptographic hash
function.
4 Distributed generation of encrypted ballot forms
The above attacks stem from the fact that a single entity is able to determine,
in the sense of being able both to know and to control, the seed values. We
now present a mechanism for the distributed generation of the seed values
and ballot forms. Throughout, we will use ElGamal encryption rather than
RSA as used in Preˆt a` Voter’05 and we will work in Z ∗p , p a (large) prime.
An analogous construction is possible for the distributed creation of the
RSA, layered onions of Preˆt a` Voter’05. However, as we want to introduce
re-encryption mixes at the tabulation stage, we present the construction for
ElGamal encryption here. We note also that the term onion is a slight
misnomer where ElGamal terms are used but we will retain in here for
historical reasons.
The ballot forms will be generated by a set of l clerks in such a way
that each contributes to the entropy of the crypto seed and this remains
encrypted throughout. Consequently the candidate list, which is derived
from the seed, remains concealed and all the clerks would have to collude to
determine the seeds values.
We assume a set of decryption tellers who hold the key shares for a
threshold ElGamal primitive with public key: (p, α, βT ). These will act
much as the tellers of the original scheme and will be responsible for the final
decryption stage after a phase of the ballot receipts after the anonymising re-
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encryption mix phase. Details of the anonymising and decryption/tabulation
phases will be given in section 7.
We also assume a set of Registrars with threshold secret key shares cor-
responding to the public key: (p, α, βR). These public keys are known to
the Clerks and are used in the construction of the ballot forms.
An initial clerk C0 generates a batch of initial seeds s
0
i . These seeds
are drawn randomly from a binomial distribution centred around 0 with
standard deviation σ. σ would probably be chosen to be of order n, the
number of candidates.
From these, C0 generates a batch of pairs of ”entangled” onions by en-
crypting each s0i , actually in the form γ
−s0
i , under the Registrar key and the
Teller key:
({γ−s0i }PKR , {γ−s
0
i }PKT ).
Expressed in full as ElGamal encryptions these have the form:
(αx
0
i , β
x0
i
R .γ
−s0
i ), (αy
0
i , β
y0
i
T .γ
−s0
i )
for fresh random values x0i , y
0
i drawn from Z
∗
p .
Notice that, for convenience later, we have encrypted the value γ−s
0
i for
some generator γ of Z∗p rather than encrypting s
0
i directly. The reason for
this will become apparent shortly.
The remaining l− 1 Clerks now perform re-encryption mixes and trans-
formations on this batch of onion pairs. Each Clerk takes the batch of pairs
output by the previous Clerk and performs a combined re-encryption along
with an injection of fresh entropy into the seed values. For each pair of
onions, the same entropy is injected into the seed value of both onions to
ensure that these values continue to match for each pair.
More precisely, for each pair of the batch, the jth Clerk Cj generates a
new, random values x¯, y¯ and s¯ and performs the following mix/transformation
on each onion pair of the batch:
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{(αxj−1i , β x
j−1
i
R .γ
−s
j−1
i ), (αy
j−1
i , β
y
j−1
i
T .γ
−s
j−1
i )}
↓
{(αxj−1i .αx¯ji , β x
j−1
i
R .β
x¯
j
i
R .γ
−s
j−1
i .γ−s¯
j
i ), (αy
j−1
i .αy¯
j
i , β
y
j−1
i
R .β
y¯
j
i
R .γ
−s
j−1
i .γ−s¯
j
i )}
↓
{(α(xj−1i +x¯ji ), β (x
j−1
i
+ x¯j
i
)
R .γ
−(sj−1
i
+s¯j
i
)), (α(y
j−1
i
+y¯j
i
), β
(yj−1
i
+ y¯j
i
)
R .γ
−(sj−1
i
+s¯j
i
))}
↓
{(αxji , β x
j
i
R .γ
−s
j
i ), (αy
j
i , β
y
j
i
T .γ
−s
j
i )}
where
x
j
i = x
j−1
i + x¯
j
i
y
j
i = y
j−1
i + y¯
j
i
s
j
i = s
j−1
i + s¯
j
i
The x¯, y¯ denote fresh random values drawn from from Z ∗p generated by
the Clerk during the mix. Similarly the s¯ values are freshly created random
values except that these are again chosen randomly and independently with a
binomial distribution mean 0 and standard deviation σ. Having transformed
each onion pair in this way, the Clerk Cj then performs a secret shuffle on
the batch and outputs the result to the next Clerk, Cj+1.
Thus, each Clerk performs a re-encryption mix along with the injection
of further entropy into the seed values s¯.
So the final output after l − 1 mixes is a batch of pairs of oinons of the
form: {{(αxi , βxiR .γ−si), (αyi , βyiT .γ−si)} where:
xi = x
l
i , yi = y
l
i , si = s
l
i
The final si values will have binomial distribution mean 0 and standard
deviation σ
√
(l).
We will refer to the first onion as the “Registrar onion” or “booth onion”
and the second onion as the “Teller onion”.
For each pair, assuming correct behaviour of the clerks, the s values in the
two onions should match. We’ll discuss mechanisms to detect corruption of
the forms later. As the seed values, and hence the candidate orders, remain
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encrypted, none of clerks knows the seed values and only if they all acted in
collusion could they determine the seed values. These “proto-ballot form”
can now be stored and distributed in encrypted form, thus avoiding the
chain of custody problems mentioned above. The seed values can now be
revealed on demand by a threshold set of the Registrars.
5 On-demand creation of ballot forms
The above construction of the proto-ballot forms means that the ballot form
material can be stored and distributed in encrypted form. Once registered
at the polling station, voters are assigned at random one of these forms:
onionL onionR
The voter proceeds to the booth in which they find a device that reads
the left-hand onion. In the simplest case, the secret key to decrypt the left-
hand onions could be held in the devices in the booths. Thus, the left hand
onion could be decrypted in the booth, the seed value s revealed and the
candidate order pi derived as some agreed function of s. If lodging the keys
in a single device is considered rather fragile, the left-hand onion could be
encrypted under a threshold key held by a number of registrars. The onions
could be transmitted to these registrars and a threshold set of these would
then decrypt the onions and return the seed to the booth device.
The candidate list can now be printed by the device in the booth to give
a standard Preˆt a` Voter ballot form:
Democritus
Plato
Socrates
Thales
onionL onionR
As an additional precaution, the left-hand onion might be separately
destroyed.
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The point of the paired onions is now clear: we arrange for the booth
device to see only the left hand onion and so it will not know the association
of the candidate list with the right hand, teller onion that will appear on the
receipt. Various mechanisms are possible to ensure that the booth device
does not see the right-hand onion. The scratch strip mechanism could be
invoked here again for example: the right-hand onion would be covered by
a scratch strip that would only be removed at the time of casting, or even
at some time after casting. The voter only really needs to reveal the teller
onion when they come to check their receipt on the WBB.
Strictly speaking, the lth clerk in collusion with the booth device could
form the candidate list/onion association. Elaborations of the scheme to
counter the threat of such collusion attacks are the subject of ongoing re-
search.
6 Supervised casting of a ballot
The voter now has a “conventional” Preˆt a` Voter style ballot form with the
candidate list and the associated right hands (teller) onion. His vote can
now be cast in the usual way by marking an X against the candidate of
their choice. The left hand strip is detached and discarded and the voter
leaves the booth and casts their vote in the presence of an official exactly as
described previously. Their receipt is recorded digitally as (r, onion), where
r is the index value indicating the position of the X.
The receipt can be digitally signed and franked at this point to counter
any receipt faking attacks.
Sigo(r, (α
y , β
y
T .γ
−si)
Once the election has closed, copies of the digitised receipts will be posted
to the WBB exactly as before and the voters can visit this and assure them-
selves that their receipt has been correctly registered. In addition to this, a
Verified Encrypted Paper Audit Trail mechanism could be deployed: at the
time of casting, an extra paper copy of the receipt is made and retained by
the returning officer for example. This can be used to independently check
the correspondence with the receipts posted to the WBB.
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7 Re-encryption/tabulation mixes
Our construction leads to ElGamal onions which would appear to be well
suited to being put through re-encryption mixes. However, the form of the
ballot receipts means that this is not quite straightforward: in addition to
the onion term we have the index value, in the clear as it were. An obvious
approach would be to send the receipt terms through the mix re-encrypting
the onions whilst leaving the index values unchanged. The problem with
this is that an adversary is able to partition the mix according to the index
values. There may be situations in which this is acceptable, for example
large elections in which the number of voters vastly exceeds the number of
voting options. In general it seems rather unsatisfactory.
A more satisfactory solution, at least for the case of a simple selection
of one candidate from the list, is described in this section. We will discuss
how to achieve full mixing in the more general case in section 10.
In this case we restrict ourselves to just cyclic shifts from the base order-
ing of the candidate list from a base ordering. For single candidate choice
elections, this is sufficient to ensure that the receipts do not reveal the voter’s
selection. For more general styles of election, in which for example voters
are required to indicate a ranking of the candidates, we of course need to
allow full permutations of the candidate list. Indeed, even in the case of
single selection elections, it is preferable to allow full permutations in order
to eliminate any possibility of a systematic corruption of votes. For this
moment we discuss the approach of simple cyclic shifts.
Let si be the shift of the candidate list for the ith ballot form. We can
absorb the index value r into the onion:
(αy , βyT .γ
r−si)
This gives a pure ElGamal term and the value r − si taken modulo n
indicates the voter’s the original candidate choice in the base ordering. These
ElGamal terms can now be sent through a conventional re-encryption mix
by a set of mix tellers, see for example [3]. These mix tellers do not hold
any secret keys but read in a batch of ElGamal terms from the WBB, re-
encrypt each of them and then post the resulting terms in random order to
the WBB. After an appropriate number of such anonymising re-encryption
mixes, (a threshold set of) the decryption tellers take over to extract the
plaintext values.
Thus, in contrast to the decryption mixes uses previously, the anonymis-
ing and decrypting phases are separated out in re-encryption mixes.
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This will yield decrypted terms of the form:
γr−si (mod p).
Now we have to extract the values r− si (mod n) to recover the original
votes. The difficulty is that r − si is the discrete log of γr−si in Z∗p so in
general, if the seed values had been drawn randomly from Z ∗p , computing
this would be intractable. However, we have set things up so that the s
values are drawn from a binomial distribution so we can search the space
very efficiently. We could, for example, generate a look-up table for the logs
out to some multiple of σ
√
(l). Occasionally we will have an outlier that will
require some search beyond the range of the look-up table.
7.1 Coercion resistance and plausible deniability
The point of using a binomial distribution for the seed value is to ensure
plausible deniability or coercion resistance whilst at the same time avoid-
ing the discrete log problem. An alternative approach would be to bound
the possible seed values generated by the clerks to lie in some fixed range,
between −M and +M say. This would have the problem that occasionally
we would hit situations in which final decrypted r− s values would take on
extreme values, e.g., r − s = −M . In this case, an adversary could deduce
that r must have equalled 0 and so be able to link this vote value back to a
subset of the receipts, i.e., receipts with the index value 0.
Using a distribution avoids such “edge effects” whilst avoiding our having
to compute arbitrary discrete logs in Z∗p . Arguably, the adversary would be
able to assign a non-flat probability distribution to the possible r values,
but as long no values of r can ever be eliminated, plausible deniability will
be maintained.
We should also observe that even if it were possible to link a vote back
to a particular index value, this would not typically violate ballot secrecy
unless this it so happened that this identified a unique receipt, i.e., there
happened to be only one receipt with this r value.
8 Auditing the Ballot Forms
The mechanisms described above allow for the distributed generation of
ballot forms and just-in-time decryption of the candidate list and printing
12
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Figure 3: Two sided ballot form
of the ballot forms. This has clear advantages in terms of removing the
need to trust a single entity to keep the ballot form information secret and
avoiding chain of custody issues. On the other hand, it means that we can no
longer use the random pre-auditing of pre-printed ballot forms as suggested
in [1]. Consequently, we must introduce alternative techniques to detect and
deter any corruption or malfunction in the creation of the ballot forms.
A possible approach, in the supervised context at least, is to incorporate
the two sided ballot form mechanism suggested in [7] and re-introduce a cut-
and-choose mechanism into the voter protocol. Here, a ballot form would
be assigned two independent, entangled pair of onions. One printed on one
side of the form, the other on the flip side. In the booth, on each side, the
left hand onion would be decrypted and the corresponding candidate list
printed in the left hand column. The result is two independent ballot forms,
one printed on each side, as illustrated in Figure 3.
These two sides should be thought of as being rotated around a vertical
axis with respect to each other. Thus the shaded, third column of side 1
would oppose the candidate list of side 2.
The voter makes a random choice of which side to use to cast their vote.
Having made their mark on the middle column against their candidate of
choice and leave the flip, unselected side blank. The left hand column of
the selected side is destroyed, and so the blank column of the flip side is
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destroyed. This results in a receipt on which the candidate list for the chosen
side has been destroyed, whilst the ballot form on the slip, unselected side
is intact, i.e., still has the onion value and candidate list. The information
on both sides would now be recorded when the ballot is cast and posted to
the WBB.
This flip side can now be audited and checked to ensure that the can-
didate list printed by the booth correctly corresponds to the onion value.
Such checks could be performed immediately at the time of casting to detect
any problems as soon as possible. Additionally, checks could be performed
on the posted values.
In addition to such post-auditing of the dual ballot forms, we can do
some pre-auditing of the committed onions pairs. This would help pick up
any malfunctions or corruption in the preparation of the proto-forms at an
early stage.
9 Auditing the anonymising mixes
In order to detect any malfunction or corruption by the mix tellers, we can
again use the Partial Random Checking approach of [3]. Here the checks
on audited links will be slightly different: rather than revealing the seed
information for the layer in question, the teller is required to reveal the
re-randomisation value used to e-encrypt the select link. Auditing of the
decryption tellers is quite straightforward as we don’t need any further mix-
ing at this stage (the anonymising mixes will be enough to ensure ballot
secrecy). The correctness of the decryptions can thus be directly checked by
simply encrypting the final values with the public keys and checking that
these agree with the initial terms.
10 Handling full permutations and STV style elec-
tions
In order to deal with full permutations of the candidate list it is not im-
mediately clear how to generalise the approach of section 7. As mentioned,
one possibility is to leave the index values unchanged through the mixes.
This might be acceptable in some situations but is clearly not satisfactory
in general.
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One solution is simply to have one onion for each candidate position.
For a single candidate selection the ballot receipt would in effect simply be
the onion value against the chosen candidate. This feels rather inelegant
and inefficient in terms of multiplying up the number of onions required.
For a ranked voting method, in which the voters are required to place
a rank against each candidate, a ballot receipt would now comprise n pairs
of rank value and onion. Each of these pairs could be put through the
mix separately with the rank value unchanged (allowing the adversary to
partition the mix according to the rank values seems not to matter). This
approach works fine as long as the voting method does not require a voters
rankings to be kept grouped for tabulation, as with STV for example.
11 Remote voting with Preˆt a` Voter
The encrypted ballot forms proposed here would appear to be adaptable to
remote voting. We could for example, use a protocol like that described in
[10], to transform left-hand onions encrypted under the registrars’ public
key to terms encrypted under an individual voter’s public key. The protocol
of [10] achieves this without having to reveal the underlying plaintext (seed)
in the process. A pair of such ballot forms could be supplied to each voter
in order to mimic the cut-and-choose mechanism described above. Details
of such protocols are the subject of ongoing research.
Any remote voting scheme must face problems of coercion. A possible
approach to counter such threats is the use capabilities as proposed in [4].
The possibility of using such a mechanism in conjunction with Preˆt a` Voter
2005 was explored in [2]. Voters are supplied with capabilities that are es-
sentially encryptions of a nonce and a valid string. Votes are cast along with
a capability and these go through the mix alongside the ballot terms. They
emerge from the mix decrypted. A valid capability will decrypt to a valid
plaintext. The validity or otherwise of the capability is not apparent until it
is decrypted. As a consequence, a voter who is being observed whilst casting
their vote has the possibility of deliberately and surreptitiously corrupting
their capability. As long as the voter has some window of unobserved access
to system he can cast his vote with his valid capability.
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12 Conclusions
We have proposed some extensions to Preˆt a` Voter 2005 to counter vulner-
abilities identified previously:
• Authority knowledge of ballot form crypto variables.
• Chain of custody threats.
• Chain voting attacks.
• Kleptographic channels.
The new version of the scheme counters these threats by enabling the
distributed construction of encrypted ballot forms by a set of clerks. As a
result, only a collusion of all the clerks could determine the cryptographic
seed values. This eliminates the need to trust a single entity to keep this
material secret and prevents Kleptographic attacks.
Our construction results in ballot forms in which the cryptographic seed
values remain encrypted and can be decrypted on demand. Thus, the ballot
forms with the candidate ordering can be created and printed in the booth,
so eliminating chain of custody and chain voting threats.
The new construction uses ElGamal encryption and so is better suited
to using re-encryption mixes for the anonymising/tabulation phase. The
rather special representation of the ballot receipt in Preˆt a` Voter, index
value plus cryptographic onion, means that it is not entirely straightforward
to send such terms through a re-encryption mix. We have shown how, for
single candidate selection and cyclic shifts of the candidate list at least,
the ballot receipts can be transformed into pure ElGamal terms and so are
adapted to re-encryption mixes. We have indicated how the approach may
be generalised to deal with alternative electoral methods.
This version of the scheme is, we believe, technically superior to the
2005 version in that it requires less trust assumptions and is more robust
against a number of threats. On the other hand, from a socio-technical
point of view, it may have certain disadvantages. The voter experience is a
little more complex, in particular the need for the cut-and-choose element
on the voter protocol, which could have usability implications as well as
opening up possibilities of “social engineering” style attacks, [5]. Thus, it is
possible that, for some situations like general elections perhaps, in evaluating
the trade-off between the trust assumptions of Preˆt a` Voter 2005 and the
usability issues of this scheme, the former might be deemed more acceptable.
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